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Space rendezvous and docking has always been attempted with primarily one philosophic 
methodology. The slow matching of one vehicle’s orbit by a second vehicle and then a final 
closing sequence that ends in matching the orbits with perfect precision and with near zero 
relative velocities. The task is time consuming, propellant intensive, risk inherent @lume 
impingement, collisions, fuel depletion, etc.) and requires substantial hardware mass. The 
historical background and rationale as to why this approach is used is discussed in terms of 
the “path-not-taken” and in light of an alternate methodology. Rendezvous and docking by 
boom extension is suggested to have inherent advantages that today’s technology can readily 
exploit. Extension from the primary spacecraft, beyond its inherent large inertia, allows low 
inertia connections to be made rapidly and safely. Plume contamination issues are 
eliminated as well as the extra propellant mass and risk required for the final thruster 
(docking) operations. Space vehicle connection hardware can be significantly lightened. 
Also, docking sensors and controls require less fidelity; allowing them to be more robust and 
less sensitive. It is the potential safety advantage and mission risk reduction that makes this 
approach attractive, besides the prospect of nominal time and mass savings. 
Nomenclature 
A = area 
P = position (chaser spacecraft) 
T = target (position) 
V = velocity 
I. Introduction 
HE first docking in space was on Gemini VIII. The Gemini capsule successfully docked with an Agena upper T stage, seen in Figure 1. This daring, man-in-the-loop control can be compared to other bold maneuvers of times 
past, such as the first rendezvous and docking of a biplane from its mother airship on September 18, 1923 (typical of 
Figure 2, left) or the dramatic historical account from November 12, 1921: 
“Wesley May, with a five-gallon can of gasoline strapped to his back, climbs @om 
one aircraft to another in the first “air-to-air refueling. ”’ 
The first successful “conventional” plane-to-plane refueling through 
an extended fuel line (right side Figure 2) was done between two 
D.H.4B airplanes on June 25, 1923: These approaches were 
develop the process. The process was not expected to remain the 
same, but mature over time. Today, aerial reheling is controlled 
through a direct connection system and carrying gas cans from one 
plane to another is only a whimsical part of history. So it should be 
with space docking systems, yet history shows us little progress. 
The fmt Gemini docking was preceded by an interesting history 
of decisions that m y  forget took place. Space rendezvous was 
considered nearly an impossible feat and a most risky space 
undertaking. At the beginning of the lunar program, no one believed 
that a docking event should be planned. Space was just too big for 
one tiny craft to find another in. Then, they not only had to match up 
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Figure 1: Agena seen from Gemini Vm 
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Figure 2: Early Bi-Plane to airship docking (left) and first aerial refueling (right) 
precisely at the right time, and in the right position, but also, they had to be oriented correctly, with velocity and 
acceleration components near zero. If an Earth rendezvous was hotly debated, a lunar rendezvous was considered 
irresponsible, if not outright mad. Although the successful Apollo missions may cloud memories, it is interesting to 
revisit the situation in the early 1960’s. “Direct ascent was basically the method that had been pictured in science 
fiction novels and Hollywood movies. A massive rocket the size of a battleship would be fired directly to the moon, 
land and then blast off for home directly fiom the lunar surface. The trip would be like that of a chartered bus, 
moving fiom point A to point B and back to A again in one brute of a vehicle. Strong feelings existed within NASA 
in favor of direct ascent, largely because it meant the development of a proposed giant booster named the Nova.”3 
Dr. John C. Houbolt at NASA Langley Research Center is remembered as the key person who pushed for Lunar 
Orbit Rendezvous (LOR), which was eventually so successhl. However, in 1961 in meeting after meeting the idea 
failed to gain any support. “As Houbolt remembers bitterly, the Lmdin Committee “turned down LOR cold.” 
... Houbolt was crushed when he heard the results. Having LOR placed at the same level of disdain as the ridiculous 
lunar-surface rendezvous was especially insulting. He had given the Lundin Committee his full-blown pitch, 
complete with the foldout sheet and slides. ... Loftin reflects back on the general fear and pessimism about LOR that 
ultimately ruled over the committee: We thought it was too risky. Remember in 1961 we hadn‘t even orbited Glenn 
yet. We certainly had done no rendezvous yet ... it had to be dead right the first time. I mean that just seemed like a 
bit much.”4 
Such are the historic beginnings of docking in space. But eventually, the exponential nature of the rocket 
equation; the need to meet the politically set goal of a successful Moon mission by the end of the decade; the real 
need to keep cost acceptable; the clean programmatic separation of hardware and functions; and many other reasons 
forced the onlysatisfactory solution to emerge no matter how risky it appeared. Orbital Rendezvous and Docking 
(OR&D) became part of space exploration as an integral, even indispensable, component. 
II. Apollo Docking Trade-Tree Decisions 
The psychological and actual engineering hurdles remained and the decisions made along the ‘docking trade- 
tree’ still effect what is done today. Once a method or product is established, even by bold means, it becomes 
difficult, if not impossible, to replace. The fxst big challenge for Apollo OR&D was getting the two crafts in close 
proximity. Then taking no risks, they used slow, cautious, stable flight by steady-handed pilots. Any additional 
hardware development, astronaut training, or precious electrical power needed for the Command Module (Apollo 
had no solar cells, immature battery technology and inefficient electrical systems) was simply going to be ignored. 
In preliminary studies, engineers did consider boom or truss type extensions as docking methods. Excellent 
NASA documentation by Robert D. Langley captures the entire docking technical development from its beginning 
of the Apollo program through Apollo 14 It took 18 months, from the 1962 announcement that Apollo 
would use LOR, to the selection of the probe and drogue concept as the final design. Development, manufacturing, 
and qualification took several years and the system was first fully tested in flight on Apollo IX (March 1969). The 
system was considered slightly conservative, due to the original and unchanged docking and transfer requirements: 
0 
0 
e 
0 
Axial (closing) Velocity - 0.0305 to 0.305 m/s (0.1 to 1.0 Wsec) 
Radial (transverse) Velocity- 0.0 to 0.1524 m/s  (0.O.to 0.5 Wsec) 
Angular Velocity - 0.0 to 1 .O degreelsecond 
Radial Alignment - 0.0 to 0.3048 m (0.0 to 1.0 Ft) 
Angular X-axis Alignment - 0.0 to 10 degrees 
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Rotational Alignment - minus 60 degrees (+/- 10 degrees) 
The requirement was to handle any combination of these loads, so the system was heavy and the approach a very 
slow 0.37 mph design point. Impact docking systems were favored where the excess momentum (again being 
conservative) would be helpful in initiating the locking mechanisms. The three impact types (probe & drogue, ring 
& cone and Gemini system) had advantages and disadvantages as mechanical systems and their merits are not at 
issue here. They all operate on the same principle and have the same characteristic limitations. In comparison, four 
non-impacting systems were initially proposed Inflatable Probe, Stem, Stem & Cable and Inflatable Tunnel 
(Figures 3 and 4, left and right respectively). 
Figure 3: Inflatable probe docking mechanism (left) and stem docking system (right) 
Figure 4: Stem and cable design (left) and inflatable tunnel concept (right) 
The urgency of the overall lunar program forced decisions to be made with incomplete or marginal technical 
information and more on “best engineering judgment.” The report states in its opening paragraph under the 
Selection Process section, “The selection of a docking system for the Apollo Program was based on limited 
knowledge because experience with actual hardware in space or from ground-based docking simulations was almost 
nonexistent.”6 They did set up crude half-scale models on air-bearings of each candidate system to get some 
practical data for each in which to compare. However, the engineering consensus is recorded as “Results of the test 
and dynamic analysis programs indicated that all of the proposed systems were feasible, although the inflatable 
probe was considered to be marginal.”’ This is not surprising, considering the state of the art at the time. Nor is the 
final selection of the probe & drogue ‘by default’. The straightforward mechanical approach scored favorably and 
would be the natural choice for them. Of course, hindsight shows they were overly optimistic in scoring the impact 
docking systems so high in the “Operational Tasks (docking)’’ and “Design Simplicity” categories; actually giving 
the probe & drogue the maximum score in both areas. Considering the complexity described in the rest of the 
document, the design changes required during development and the Apollo XIV docking failure investigation, the 
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79.4 (175) 78.5 (173) 81.2 (179) 90.3 (199) 
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Probe/Drogue Cone/Ring Gemini 
72.1 (159) 161 (355) 481 (1060) 
case can be made that the non-impacting systems should have been more competitive at the time. The Apollo 
OR&D engineers may not have disagreed with that argument. A final point made in the results section summary 
was, “Therefore, because only two of the proposed concepts could be eliminated from contention and because no 
single concept was clearly superior, judgment was obviously the key factor in selecting a docking concept.”’ Two 
things remain unclear in the analysis that is pertinent today. First, what was their expected fuel usage and second, 
did they ever quantify the spacecraft collision risk for each approach? 
A. Propellant usage 
The Apollo technical document indicated that the expected propellant needed for the non-impact approach was 
greater than the impact technique. There is little detail on this, but one can reverse-engineer from the data supplied. 
The difference between the effective weight and the injected weight is the impact on propellant required to do the 
mission. Results are listed in Table 1. It is clear from the large value for the Gemini concept that significant mass 
on the Lunar Excursion Module (LEM) would cost dearly and that fact is specifically cited in the literature. 
Although it is unclear, it is suspected the values also reflect the expected maneuvering propellant required with each 
docking approach. There appears no correlation with mass or the Stem concept would have done much better. It is 
proposed that the operational scenario was to require the Stem and similar concepts to come to a complete relative 
stop to the target vehicle and then make a short (less than 7 meters) “non-impact” connection; the spacecraft then 
being drawn together. This could explain a slight additional propellant demand over the same maneuver, but letting 
the vehicles continue with some minor closing velocity and “impact” together. Of course, this point is a noteworthy 
distinction to the notion of boom rendezvous as proposed here as will later be explained. 
Table 1: “Propellant” mass estimation in kilograms (lbs) 
B. Collision Risks 
It is interesting to note that a risk assessment or collision probability was not discussed in this development 
work. Perhaps the details are captured in other NASA documents, but the comparison of one docking system to 
another should reflect inherent risk. There was a category in the selection summary chart called “CM Protection” 
(CM indicating the Command Module) and this may have sufficed to cover their risk weighting. Nevertheless, it is 
hard to imagine why the non-impacting systems were rated lower with the exception of the Inflatable Tunnel. The 
tunnel scored the highest in that category receiving the maximum score possible; it being the only system where the 
vehicles never come in contact with each other. This ‘theoretically’ is an advantage but in practical application, then 
or now, the rigidity of the structure is questionable - particularly when mid-course correction or Apollo 13 type abort 
maneuvers are considered. The standoff of even a few meters should have been a s i m c a n t  benefit over the “ram 
it”-and-pray-your-closing-velocity-measureme~~-is-accurate approach. 
There are other risks, perhaps not known at the decision time. At a recent awards luncheon, the keynote speaker, 
astronaut Thomas K (TK) Mattingly, related his experiences during the Apollo XVI flight. He specifically 
recounted the unsettling pinging noise the crew heard seconds after they fired the command module thrusters as they 
were docking with the LEM.’ The noise was never anythmg they anticipated or heard in training, but was the result 
of the control thruster’s gas plume reflecting off the LEM and hitting the command module. Such startling 
experience alerts spacecraft designers of the real risk of plume impingement issues. Another source also points out 
the risk level remaining, even after seven years of full hardware development. 
“Perhaps the biggest concern before Apollo 9 was the docking maneuver. A 1972 report revealed 
that there was little confidence in the docking system in early 1969. At a January program review, 
Phillips said that problems encountered during probe and drogue testing worried him. On several 
occasions, when the command module% extendable probe had nuzzled into the lander’s funnel- 
shaped drogue, the capture latches had failed to engage. In other tests, they had only partially 
caught, raising the specter of ”jack-knifmg” and possible damage to one of the spacecraft, probably 
the lunar module. Phillips was also concerned that the sharp edges on the probe might scar the 
drogue, when the crafts were reeled together and prevent airtight sealing of the 12 latches on the 
command module docking ring.”” 
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In theory, the non-impacting docking approaches should allow lower weight connection systems to be used, as 
the contact is controlled and should be well below the maximum design velocities of the components used for the 
impact docking systems. The degree of measurement uncertainty should also demand more margins for safety on 
impact docking systems. Langley’s report states 
“Estimates of system effective weights were 
difficult to determine accurately and could be used 
to promote or degrade any of the concepts.”11 
However, the reported numbers favored the center 
probe and drogue concept (Figure 5) that after years 
of refinement only grew in mass. Significant mass 
being added for the gas actuation and hydraulic 
shock absorption subsystems. 
The influence on propellant usage is also very 
significant. As an early pilot study reported, the 
astronauts were near perfect in R&D simulations, 
using a full six-degree-of-freedom dynamic 
simulator, when using visual flight aids and with all 
systems functioning. However, the propellant 
usage was high and successful controllability was 
impaired when the control system was hampered.12 
Also, tumbling targets were difficult and used 
additional propellant as might be expected. 
Figure 5: Apollo docking hardware test 
QuickTirneN and a 
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III. Docking since Apollo 
Docking technology maturation has always been slow; taking years to develop the single operational system for 
Apollo. Skylab missions used essentially the same systems updated from the Apollo XIV malfunction review, but 
added a redundant adapter port on the side of the airlock. During October 1970, at the fmt meetings in Moscow 
between senior NASA engineers and the Russians, an agreement was made to design a compatible rendezvous and 
docking systems for all future manned  pacec craft.'^ This was not only a political goodwill gesture, but also, a first 
step in “worldwide” spaceflight risk reduction. The Apollo-Soyuz program used a similar Apollo-derived system on 
the American side of an adapter ring and the international “androgynous” coupling on the other. As a part of the 
Apollo Soyuz Test Project (ASTP), the Soviet Soyuz 16’s crew conducted a test of an Apollo-Soyuz docking 
mechanism in December 1974. This was significant, as Soyuz 15 had abruptly ended its mission after its two 
cosmonauts unsuccessfully attempted to dock with Salyut 3 station just four months before.I4 On July 15, 1975 the 
ASTP mission began with Soyuz 19 and Apollo [unofficially, Apollo 181 successfully docking after the American 
capsule extracted the adapter-docking tunnel (Figure 6) from its Saturn B1 upper stage. There were several docking 
and undocking maneuvers with both spacecrafts taking 
turns as the “target” vehicle.” Though these flights were 
all inspiring and breathtaking achievements, the technology 
and methodologies were essentially the same as the Gemini 
docking mindset, but with more refined hardware. 
The Space Shuttle did not have a docking adapter until 
space lab, but these were not for typical OR&D. It did 
however have the precursor of boom rendezvous as 
presented here. It used the arm to grapple satellites, while 
they were safely away from the orbiter and bring them 
slowly and carefully into the shuttle bay. All without using 
reaction jets in close proximity of delicate space assets or 
risk an incident with the shuttle. The International Space 
Station (ISS) went through many technical changes to its 
docking mechanisms as well as its rendezvous procedures 
over the many years of redesign. Yet, no fundamental 
reason is given why OR&D persists with a slow approach 
and ‘controlled crash’, with each new redesign effort, when 
l 
Figure 6: ASTP docking module 
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Approximate Plane Motion 
#I  
Figure 6: Orbital motions 
AIAA-2006-1239 
vehicles. In plane 
motion this is true, 
but in orbital 
mechanics you go 
from trailing in the 
identical orbit 
(labeled #I), to an 
elliptical orbit with a 
different energy state 
and unique orbital 
there has been so much development work performed. The most notable of these is the drive toward completely 
androgynous system, which have the advantage of both vehicles reverting to the passive target role should its 
primary control malfunction. According to one web source, “The CEV would utilize a new androgynous Low- 
Impact Docking System (LIDS) to mate with other exploration elements and to the ISS. This would require changes 
to existing ISS equipment. It was proposed that two new docking adapters would replace the ISS Pressurized 
Mating Adapter (PMA) and Androgynous Peripheral Attachment System (MAS) adapters after Shuttle 
retirement.”16 The docking trend continues to be reinforced with the Chinese space program reportedly selecting the 
APAS-89 docking adapter for their initial  spaceflight^.'^ 
IV. Boom Rendezvous From First Principles 
From history, we conclude that there should be inherent advantages, if the spacecraft are controllable from a safe 
offset distance. The analysis begins with two bodies in space. Ideally, they have identical vehicle orbits; thus, the x, 
y, z, spatial components are matched, the rotational rates zero (or matched), as well as the differential 
velocities/accelerations being zero, but with slightly different true anomaly values that accounts for the time of 
separation distance. This perfect situation leaves the two craft forever separated, safe, but without mission success 
of docking. The curved orbital motion can be approximated by plane motion for large radius paths @e., LEO and 
higher) over short distances between the two objects (Figure 6) and the docking maneuver should be 
straightforward. The impact system or original notion of a “short” I 
just a slight velocity variation, hopefully only in the z-direction 
I-impacting docking system will work wi 
Classic Orbital Motion 
V, ishigheryettheorbitalenergyoftheTarget( v, ) 
is greater,untiIthelasfimpulseuk pufiing the active 
uat? in a matching or crossing omit 
Figure 7: Perfect impulse maneuver 
Active Control Auuarent Motion II .. 
V, is highly variable in dimtion 
and magitude with respect to VI 
Figure 8: Feedback convergence I 
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Figure 10: Boom Rendezvous 
less attractive. A more advantageous approach 
can now be proposed as drawn in Figure 10. 
The two vehicles are now in separate circular 
orbits; one higher than the other. Thus, there 
is a positive safe separation distance that 
should reduce all risks associated with docking 
to something like the ISS with its many 
delicate appendages. There is a set rendezvous 
time, limited by the length of the extension, the 
angle, and the relative time of flight, which is 
based on the initial orbits. Added to the static 
limit of rendezvous opportunity is the relative 
motion the target craft has also made. For a 
set boom connection length, the closer the 
initial orbits are the greater the initial capture 
time is available. 
Of the terrestrial analogs, the best is the 
ship pulling into a pier. The ship is 
“weightless” in the 2-D plane, but has high 
inertia characteristic motion just like objects in 
space. Despite the fact that ships experience a tremendous damping to their motion not seen in space, the 
controllability and risk issues are still readily observed. A small boat can come in seemingly slow into a slip, yet 
people will physically struggle to prevent a violent impact with the dock. Prudent boaters will use long pole 
extensions or ropes thrown to shore, well ahead of the craft and stop the engines ahead of time. Risk mitigation is 
often a layer of tires along the dock and rubber bumpers or edging on the boat. Damage can be minor scratches to 
hundreds of dollars for repairs to dock or boat. Larger ships cannot afford such expensive risks, as a minor 
miscalculation in approach speed by an ocean going vessel could crush a pier and perhaps cost lives in the accident. 
They must use long extensions (ropes or pier booms) and be carefully controlled into the slip. The larger vessels 
often have tugboats as intermediary extensions between them and the massive dock. No one would think it is 
reasonable (or want to take the time) to drive the ship into the pier, at such a slow rate, or be assured it would lightly 
brush the end of the dock and stop. 
Another second analogy is found in aircraft in-flight refueling operations as exemplified in Figure 11 where a 
long flexible line is used. It is rational to conclude that flying one plane into another to ‘snap them together’ is high 
risk. Certainly there is less risk to fly into a lightweight (i.e., low mass) basket with the extension rod from your 
aircraft. Overshooting the ideal velocity is not catastrophic and missing the target does not impact on the safety of 
your vehicle. The worst consequence is a few extra minutes to try again and some “ribbing by the crew at the club”. 
Yet in space, we will risk 100-ton space shuttles and a 135-ton space station (Figure 12) in closing maneuvers that 
must end in precise alignments and velocities. Furthermore, practice does not make perfect as in this case, shown in 
Figure 13, where on June 25, 1997 a Russian re-supply ship collided with the Mir Space Station causing significant 
damage?’ &d attempts to conduct “autonomous” R&D 
has also ended in failure as recently as April last year when 
the DART spacecraft (short for Demonstration for 
Autonomous Rendezvous Technology), ran low on fuel 
before closing in on its planned rendezvous target, the 
Multiple Path Beyond Line of Site Communication 
(MUBLCOM) satellite?’ A classic (slight) overshoot error 
caused a collision between the spacecrafts. It was this 
mishap that raised the question among the Momentum 
exchange Electrodynamic Reboost (MXER)22 project 
team, who were investigating faster and more difficult 
rendezvous for the tether system at the time, of why 
approach the problem in this manner and not rethink the 
engineering fiom fundamental principles? 
Figure 11: Aircraft boom refueling 
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I Figure 13: Collision damage to Mir 
V. Operational Description of Space Boom Rendezvous 
The new operational scenario is proposed; use a long (-10 m to -100 m) boom extension to create a safe 
working distance and consume no propellant beyond initial orbit insertion (assuming no launch trajectory errors). 
The different variations that are possible will be considered as the space operations and hardware are explained. The 
last subsection details the full system benefits obtained by the use of this methodology. These preliminary designs 
are offered as notional and a wide range of engineering trades should be conducted for each particular application or 
mission. 
A. Hardware configurations 
The scheme relies on a boom extension away from the prirnary spacecraft body. It is presumed for packaging 
and operations, the long member is not a single rigid member, although that class could be considered in some 
mission scenarios. Assuming the extension is long enough to require launch ‘packing’ the likely candidates are: 
@ Folding arm or truss 
6 Concentric cylinders 
@ Inflatable tube or truss 
6 
@ 
@ Collapsible mast structure 
Tetherhtringer (powered or unpowered end bodies) 
Memoryhpring tape (Stem, BI-STEM, interlocking stem) 
The folding arm or truss could be a jointed mechanism like the Space Shuttle arm or simple rigid truss sections 
hinged together. Actuation might be by cable, solenoid, motorized gears, or hydraulics with subsequent mechanical 
locking (reversible or not) once the sections are aligned. Concentric cylinders are similar, but with the geometry 
being tapering sections for compact stowage. Hydraulic or gas actuated telescoping approaches are common. 
Inflatable tubes or trusses are relatively new and offer very lightweightkompact extensions that can be very long. 
However, material and manufacturing immaturity, as well as more complicated dynamics and control, can make 
these systems less attractive. Gas bottle mass can also be significant and must be factored into the trade space, as 
the volume-pressure of the system increases in order to increase stiffness and combat buckling. 
The tether or stringer is extremely efficient and low mass, but has some odd operational factors. The passive 
system has a connection end body that is jettisoned by spring or gas action. It must be pre-aligned and timed to 
intercept the target’s mating hardware. Misses conceivably can be reeled in and relaunched. An error tolerant 
system, such as used with the spinning tether catch and throw (ie., MXER Quad Trap23), can improve this approach 
greatly, but with added mass and more complexity during docking. An autonomous (i.e., powered) tip could 
maneuver and correct for final errors. This might use a micro-satellite propulsion system similar to the tip-sats 
proposed for the Ultra-light Solar Sail’s blade ends” or the propulsion packs developed for the Cubestat programz5. 
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The last two categories are the leading candidates for long, lightweight booms. The memory or steel spring type 
boom, represented by the Stem and its more sturdy cousins (the BI-STEM and interlocking stem) have long flight 
heritage:6 good reliability and promise of easily incorporating a high-tension cable in the center (Figure 14). 
Extensions of 10 meters are common and 50 to 100 meters should be possible. Control is all electric with modest 
power demands for the reel motors. The other slightly newer technology is the collapsible mast such as the 
CoilABLE boom in Figure 15, which also boasts an excellent spaceflight record?’ 
Figure 14: Twin memory-shaped stems with embedded tension stringer Figure 15: Collapsible 
mast (CoilABLE) 
There are four other important subsystems to a boom rendezvous configuration. The base of the boom can be 
rigidly fured to the spacecraft and the existing attitude control system can be used to point the boom. This uses 
propellant (having to maneuver the entire massive spacecraft about) and may not always be fine-tuned for optimal 
control. It may be most appropriate for smaller robotic vehicles. The alternative is a gimbal or Canfield Join? 
allowing rotational motion using electrical, hydraulic or gas actuation. On the other end of the boom is a locking 
mechanism. This can be a passive clip arrangement, an electric solenoid, or a wide range of androgynous or probe 
& drogue devices. The system must have a sensing or ranging system, similar to what is needed in other OR&D 
approaches but with much less accuracy. The final component is the “hard docking” device, often the biggest and 
heaviest docking subsystem component for large spacecraft like the Space Shuttle. This device can be made cleanly 
with few interfering parts and better seal arrangements since it no longer has to incorporate a error tolerant docking 
guide capable of substantial impact loads. 
B. Operations 
The major 
difference is that the extension gives a safe zone and the time to respond if alignment, velocities or locking are not 
correct. The spacecrafts are put in widely space orbits, nominally circular. They are oriented to allow the booms to 
extend at the proper angle (Figure 16, frame 1). As in common practice, one craft is the ‘>passive target” while the 
other the active or “chaser” system. This is not a requirement, but often helps to reduce confusion or uncontrolled 
feedback. One or both can have a fully or partially extended boom. As the lower altitude chaser vehicle catches up 
to the target (the reverse order is also possible), there is an ample window to make the connection. Steering the 
boom is done by orienting the spacecraft, manipulating the boom on a joint end or directly steering the boom tip, as 
in the case of a tether line. Contact is made at the other spacecraft or at the end of its extension. Although there is a 
very wide volume in which to make the initial low-inertia connection, there is a time limit planned for the capture. 
Should the contact not be made, several alternatives are available. Propellant can be used to provide a slight 
adjustment to the orbit and gain additional time, or the crafts can wait until their orbits naturally realign themselves 
for another try. This may take sometime, but often if there was difficulty in the first attempt, some mechanism, 
sensor, software or other subsystem requires the time to be checked and the anomaly corrected, before it is prudent 
to attempt docking again. 
The system would normally be used in conjunction with existing procedures and hardware. 
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Once the low-inertia extended contact is secure, the second phase of controlled maneuvering begins (Figure 16, 
frame 2). This replaces the dangerous process typically used and saves thruster propellant. The extension can be 
controllably retracted, the force being carried through a high-strength cable. Although the two vehicles have 
different orbital energies and velocities (the very point of preventing collisions), the newly combined system will 
technically be one object connected by the cable. However, in essence they behave separately; each wanting to pull 
away from the other. If the retraction speed is smooth and steady, the tension will remain on the embedded tether 
and the vehicles will be very controllable. 
A second, third or even more booms can be engaged to have better control over the roll, pitch and yaw between 
the vehicles (Figure 16 frames 2 - 4). The added lines allow more compressive strength between the vehicles, 
perational boom rendezvous sequence 
should that be required (unlikely if the procedure is followed and no disturbing force such as a thruster k i n g  is 
added to the scenario). The reeling rate can be done manually, but a computer programmed with an input-shaping 
algorithm to actively dampen any unwanted motion is more advantageou~.~~ As the two bodies are brought together, 
the alignment is checked and small corrections can be made to ensure proper alignment. Finally, the hard docking 
mounts are engaged (Figure 16, frame 5) and the last tight connection is made (Figure 16, frame 6). 
. System benefits 
There are six key areas that the boom rendezvous technique positively impacts. These are inherent qualities of 
the methodology and thus difficult, if not impossible, to diminish as the hardware is matured and operational 
implementation takes place: 
System mass reduction (both propellant and hardware) 
Collision avoidance 
Thruster risk reduction (plume impingement and misfiring) 
Lower fidelity sensor and control system requirements 
Incorporates existing techniques and hardware (operating as backup if desired) 
Reduced docking times 
System mass is reduced by the elimination of propellant required for the slow maneuvering and eventual 
overshoothndershoot that inevitably occurs. The mass can be a significant and mission-limiting amount, as in the 
case of the DART spacecraft. For larger vehicles like the Shuttle, the propellant mass is significant because of the 
large size of the object being docked and results in hundreds of kilograms of lost payload. In the case of the 
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memory stem boom, this mass is directly replaced with electrical power, at a time when most onboard subsystems or 
operations are off or at a minimum. The boom steering ability has the benefit of reducing propellant mass by 
minimizing the initial orientation and rotation rate requirements for both target and chaser vehicles. Further, mass is 
saved through the use of a simplified hard-docking apparatus. There are two inherit advantages to this. First, the 
docking structure does not have to take the full momentum of a slightly misaligned or rotating mass. This 
eliminates the interleaving petals or probeldrogue assemblies. Secondly, there is no collision or “controlled crash” 
at the end, eliminating shock absorbers and thick coupling plates. The docking system also has to be built with 
additional strength tolerance to withstand the error tolerance of the sensor and control system. Thus, the structure 
normally must be heavy enough to absorb the over-speed that can be expected through errors in velocity, position, or 
thrusting (i.e., the usual last minute forward thrust added to ensure latching when under-speed). These issues are not 
associated with a docking system comprised of three extension booms, which do add mass, being a new system 
onboard the spacecraft. Since similar systems @.e., BI-STEM actuator) have been flown in space a benefit is 
expected, but detail designs are required to quantifj genuine mass savings. 
Collision avoidance is the primary driver for the mass, complexity and slow docking required under existing 
techniques, therefore, this is a pivotal issue to be eliminated. By using the extension booms, a spacecraft no longer 
is required to time an interception or try to precisely match an identical orbit in order to dock. A separate and safe 
orbit anywhere close to the target vehicle will be sufficient. With different orbits established, no collision is 
possible, through minor errors, confhion, missed commands, or any credible hardware failure (thruster 
malfunctions, sensors miss calibrations, or other anomalies). It also allows the injection stage to perform “docking 
orbit” insertion if desired. The booms are low inertia objects and easily controlled. If they do collide, the flexibility 
in the system acts as a damper. Furthermore, the low mass components are less prone to galling or other damage. 
For the retracting memory or stem boom, the fast retraction capability that is of interest for the MXER tether 
application, makes it ideal for rapid, last moment corrections to rendezvous position. 
Thruster risk is a major factor in docking, as the propulsion systems must be very reliable and of high 
repeatability over a very small impulse bit. There is high risk in a stuck thruster near the final contact point or even 
small pointing error/thruster imbalance (assuming they are normally fired in pairs). Because the 
precisiodrepeatability is very difficult to achieve, opposing thruster pairs are fired simultaneously to obtain the 
desired narrow impulse, one set being shutdown a fraction earlier than the other. This not only wastes propellant, 
but also, imparts a plume towards the target spacecraft. Plume impingement also occurs when closing velocity is 
too high and a forward thruster is fired to slow the chaser craft. This was readily apparent from the Apollo-Soy 
history text where an entire chapter “Soviet Worries About Apollo Minus X Thrusters” is dedicated to the intense 
plume impingement risk  negotiation^.^' Side thruster operation can impinge on the target depending on the 
geometzylsize of the vehicle and the thruster directiodcone angle. Damage can be physical spalling of materials or 
plating of instruments or windows with propellant residue. Boom extension eliminates all thruster firing anywhere 
near the target and the thrusters can be locked down to ensure no misfiring at an inopportune moment, again 
decreasing the risk during docking. Another unique benefit that a physical extension gains over thruster control is 
energy dampening. Minor motion from either end can be absorbed and larger oscillations reduced. With active 
input control, all undesirable motion can be eliminated between the two docking vehicles. 
In conjunction with reduced thruster parameters, the sensor and control system can benefit by a tremendous 
relief from stringent requirements. Knowledge of the existing orbit is no longer critical because of the wide zone 
that the boom easily accommodates. Accurate propellant measuring, thruster direction regulation, precise gas value 
timing and impulse acceleration measurements are not needed. Only a gross proximity value need be known before 
engaging the boom extensions. Then the level of sensor and control is dictated only by the closing rate of the boom 
end, which can experience a greater acceleration and easily afford 6-DOF motion, as well as reverses, since it is 
accomplished by an all electric system. If man-in-the-loop control is desired, the operation is easily observable 
giving direct feedback to the operator. Overshoot, viewer depth perception, timing, and other typical difficulties in 
docking the vehicle itself are eliminated, with all the activity conducted in the far field of view. In the same way, 
the computer controller can be a simpler algorithm with low tolerance for speed, acceleration and orientation limits. 
It essentially eliminates the roll orientation of the vehicle, if the locking mechanism is axisymmetric. It also allows 
the sensor/control system use of the full 3-dimensional space, to bracket the target spot. This is impossible with 
conventional docking approaches, as a miss, by even a meter, would impact and possibly damage the target or the 
probe. Always keeping to the positive side of the target makes the rendezvous more difficult and of longer duration. 
A benefit not intuitively appreciated is the fact that nothing in the conventional OR&D approach needs to be 
changed in order to implement the boom rendezvous technique and gain many of its benefits. The systems are not 
mutually exclusive and in fact are complementary in many ways. A boom system can be added to an existing 
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system, thus preserving all the heavy-duty hardware, precision controYsensors and propellant systems as backup. 
The boom can do most of the docking and if it is incapable of enough force to close the existing latching 
mechanisms, a final push can be added, when the target is held directly in place. Designs and knowledge of 
materials for the probe and drogue approach are ideal for the connection of the boom. The hard-docking device may 
be identical, similar to or a derivative of the existing hardware presently used. The advantages will be in the lighter 
overall mass, the cleaner opening (particularly important for crew access ports), the lower complexity of the 
mechanism (as it does not have to take the full impact or correct for misalignments), and the complete elimination of 
any hardware insert in the docking port (i.e., in the Apollo style probe & drogue configuration). 
Timesaving is a final benefit that should be achieved, although a quantified value is hard to ascertain without a 
more detailed design. The injection directly into a close (circular) orbit without the need for a long position 
verification process is possible. Thruster verificatiodarming could be eliminated, although deployment of a solar 
panel may be added (full batteries maybe sufficient or body mounted panels are possible options). The electrical 
booms should be readily deployable (often they are the first systems on satellites used to set up solar arrays or 
antennas) and little time spent idle, coasting at ever-slower closing speeds. Extensions such as the BI-STEM boom 
can be rapidly extended and retracted over tens of meters, while simultaneously being steered at their base. Once 
interconnected the retraction is steady but can be much faster than the standard safe closing velocities. Final 
connection is on the same time scale, unless docking hardware or complexity is eliminated, as is likely in a crew 
transfer docking. 
VI. Conclusion 
It was established that OR&D was from the very beginning, and is today, considered a difficult space function to 
perform. Nonetheless, it was required for Apollo missions and continues to be necessary for both manned and 
robotic missions. The study of the engineering decisions made during the early stages of Apollo did show they 
considered the boom-rendezvous approach in the form of non-impacting docking systems. The rationale for 
selecting the impact approach for development was reasonable but not conclusive. It is clear that their choice was 
not based upon rigorous data and that the choice may not be the ideal solution for today’s risk-averse space program. 
There are compelling reasons to reexamine the path taken and seriously reevaluate the very fundamentals of space 
rendezvous and docking methodology. 
A new design was proposed that is akin to the stern and cable design proposed for the Apollo program, but with 
substantial hfferences in hardware and application. This boom rendezvous methodology was conceived and 
developed completely independent of any OR&D methods of the past. The idea germinated from first-principle 
inertia arguments, the failure of the DART mission, and the research done for the MXER tether catch mechanism. 
The design is meant to reduce total program risk. It looks at the impact of mass, propellant, redundancy, crew 
operations, collision avoidance and timeliness. Expected mass savings come from the motorized system replacing 
propellant and precise thruster control systems. The very low contact velocity and controlled manner in which the 
spacecrafts join, allows a much simpler and less massive hard-docking mechanism. Collision avoidance is inherent, 
as the two vehicles remain in distinctly different orbits, and risks due to plume impingement, thruster mors, 
sensor/control responsiveness and other anomalies are eIiminated. Finally, there is an on-orbit timesaving potential 
and the flexibility of keeping the existing OR&D approach as redundant backup, while transitioning towards ever- 
greater benefits using the boom rendezvous technique. 
The existing infrastructure and accepted custom makes change difficult in any situation, but the opportunity is 
available now with the Space Shuttle’s eventual retirement, the initiation of a CEV for lunar exploration and new 
space assets being developed, for a fresh look to determine if one of the most difficult and high risk space operations 
is appropriate or has room for improvement. 
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